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Executive Summary 
Operating a cloud resource involves addressing security requirements of multiple stakeholders: 
primarily those of the resource operator and those using the resource. These parties may have 
different incentives related to security as well as different levels of acumen. Operators may at 
times run images whose trustworthiness is not established and provide users with privileged 
access within a running virtual machine or container that would be uncommon on normal 
computing resources. These factors combine to form an environment that, by its nature, is 
difficult to secure. 
This document, authored as a collaborative effort between academic cloud service providers 
and security professionals, puts forth a set of Security Best Practices for developing and 
operating an academic cloud resource. Nine use cases deemed important by the authors are 
explored along with their security concerns. For each use case, one or more security best 
practices is given that balances the needs of the stakeholders and mitigates risk. The nine use 
cases are: 
1. Disseminate Localized Best Practices 
2. Ensure Image Trustworthiness 
3. Provide Method to Manage User Secrets 
4. Support Privileged Access within Images 
5. Empower Users with Self-service DNS Management 
6. Provide Method to Manage User Configurations 
7. Provide Service Accounts 
8. Offer Monitoring Services 
9. Offer Identity and Access Management-aware Continuous Integration / Continuous 
Delivery Services 
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Introduction 
A “cloud resource” provides a means for users to run virtual machines or containers such that 
they can have a custom software stack and isolation from other users. Virtual machines or 
container images (henceforth “images”) can be curated and provided by the cloud resource 
operator, provided by the user, or provided by third parties. 
Operating a cloud resource involves addressing security requirements of multiple stakeholders: 
those of the resource operator and those of the resource user. These stakeholders may have 
different prioritization of security requirements and different levels of security acumen. 
Operators may at times run images whose trustworthiness is not established and grant users 
privileged access within their running image that would be uncommon on non-virtualized 
computing resources.  Moreover, users, with their elevated privileges, can misconfigure 
services, expose sensitive data or choose protocols/solutions that offer less security for the 
sake of installation or operating costs.  These factors can lead to an environment that, by its 
nature, is difficult to secure. 
Guiding our effort in tackling the unique security risks to academic cloud services are three 
basic principles, specifically: security is a shared concern between a cloud service provider and 
a cloud service user, neither can expect the other to fully address security; a clean delineation 
between cloud service provider and cloud service user of security responsibilities is critical to 
ensure all responsibilities are met; and the cloud service provider has the responsibility to 
ensure all security responsibilities are articulated and the cloud service user is educated about 
how to fulfill their responsibilities.  These principles manifest themselves throughout the 
document. 
Scope 
The term Cloud Service Provider can imply a broad range of organizations who are not intended 
as the audience of the output of this document. This document focuses only on those academic 
organizations and projects that host and develop the system infrastructure for providing access 
to host virtualization technologies at the hardware or operating system level, including, 
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) and Science-as-a-Service 
(SaaS) services. The focal point of this document also encompasses the organizational 
processes and policies in managing and securing these technologies . It is a list of 1
recommendations for security best practices within an academic cloud service provider, but the 
document is not intended to provide an exhaustive list, rather to identify and address those 
practices unique to cloud services provided in an academic or research environment. 
1 ​This document does not address concerns with network hardware virtualization technologies 
such as Software Defined Networking (SDN). 
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Stakeholders 
As alluded to above, the security of a cloud resource affects multiple stakeholders.  In an 
academic environment, we have identified three types, Academic Cloud Resource/Service 
Providers, Academic CI (Cyberinfrastructure) Providers, and Users.  We list examples of each 
and then identify general security concerns that affect each type.  Although the security 
concerns we include are general and not all-inclusive, our goal is to provide a basis of why our 
best practices are relevant to each of the various stakeholders: 
● Academic Cloud Resource/Service Providers​: providers of cloud services to the 
community.  Atmosphere (​http://www.cyverse.org/atmosphere​), HUBzero 
(​https://hubzero.org/​), Jetstream (​https://jetstream-cloud.org/​), RedCloud 
(​https://www.cac.cornell.edu/services/cloudservices.aspx​), and science gateways are 
examples of Academic Cloud Resouce/Service Providers.  Examples of general security 
concerns that may affect them, include ​1. Loss/failure of operational dependencies​ , ​2. 
Increased exposure to vulnerabilities​ , ​3. Ineffective or untimely incident 
response/analysis​ , ​4. Loss/exposure of user data within images due to factors within 
provider’s purview​ , and ​5. Loss of reputation​  (see ​Appendix A​). 
● Academic CI (Cyberinfrastructure) Providers​: developers of infrastructure (typically 
software) which is integrated by Resource/Service Providers into their services.  Agave 
(​https://agaveapi.co/​), Cyverse (​http://www.cyverse.org/​), Galaxy 
(​https://galaxyproject.org/cloud/​), Globus (​https://www.globus.org/​), an SciGaP 
(​https://scigap.org/​) are examples of Academic CI Providers.  Example security concerns 
that affect these types are ​2. Increased exposure to vulnerabilities​ , ​3. Ineffective or 
untimely incident response/analysis​ , ​4. Loss/exposure of user data within images due to 
factors within provider’s purview​ , and ​5. Loss of reputation​  (see ​Appendix A​). 
● Users​: researchers and others using cloud infrastructure, including, researchers, image 
providers, external users who may be impacted by activities within an image.  Example 
security concerns that impact Users are ​1. Loss or unpredictability of 
services/performance​ , ​2. Loss/exposure of secrets & sensitive/embargoed data​ , and ​3. 
Loss of reputation​  (see ​Appendix B​). 
Prerequisites 
Our assumption is that the first two stakeholders above, i.e., academic cloud resource/service 
and academic CI providers, have certain common IT and security practices already in place in 
their environment. These practices are not unique to the operations of a cloud service, and thus, 
are outside of the scope of this document, including: system logging and monitoring, network 
logging and monitoring, control of privileged access, configuration management, Identity and 
access management, effective physical and wireless security, hardware lifecycle practices, and 
an active information security program. 
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Recommended resources describing these practices and their implementation can be found 
from a variety of sources. Some examples of these are: 
● CIS Benchmarks and Security Controls (​https://www.cisecurity.org/cis-benchmarks/​, 
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/​) 
● Guide to Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Science and Engineering Projects 
(​https://trustedci.org/guide/​) 
● NIST 800 Series Special Publications 800-92, 800-95, 800-125, 800-125A-rev1, and 
800-190 (​https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/sp800​) 
● OpenStack Security Guide (​https://docs.openstack.org/security-guide/​) 
Related Work 
Several recent projects attempt to address similar issues as to our goal in this document, but we 
note that the cloud best practice documents we list in ​Appendix C​ are for ​general​  cloud service 
providers, not necessarily intended for the uniqueness of the academic cloud.  However, there 
is indeed overlap between general cloud best practices and academic cloud best practices.  In 
the cases where our best practices are similar to recommended solutions suggested by others, 
we note that in our practices (see ​References​). 
Terminology 
Terminology and definitions used in this document: 
● Cloud Service:​ An internet accessible compute service with the intended purpose of 
allowing users to instantiate and manage system images. 
● Image:​ A data file containing the contents of a virtual machine or container. 
● Resource/Service Provider​: A operator of a cloud service​. 
● Running image:​ An instantiated image that is actively processing.  
● Security concern​: Any issue that increases security risk to the cloud service. 
● Use case​: “In software and systems engineering, a use case is a list of actions or event 
steps typically defining the interactions between a role (known in the Unified Modeling 
Language as an actor) and a system to achieve a goal.” - 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use_case 
● User​: A user of a cloud service. Someone instantiating and managing running images. 
Use Cases, Security Concerns, and Best Practices 
This section explores nine cloud use cases that the working group identifies as desirable to 
support, but also may increase risk to the service provider’s security.  For each, the use case is 
described and the security issues or concerns that arise are analyzed.  The working group then 
introduces its recommended, best practices to mitigate against the risk imposed by the offering 
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the use-case.  Finally, where best practices only address certain aspects of the risk, open 
challenges are itemized. 
Note, the list below is ordered by importance that this community bestows upon each use-case, 
where the lowest itemized use-cases are deemed most important.  This ordering may not 
necessarily reflect cost, both in expertise or ease of implementation, or the potential impact 
reaped by the service provider enabling any of the use-cases.  It is conceivable that all 
use-cases could be deemed “first class services”, depending on the service provider. 
1. Disseminate Localized Best Practices 
Use Case​: Users of a cloud service will have a number of tasks that are common across cloud 
services, but vary in details whose implementation can lead to errors with security 
consequences. Some examples include:  
● How to carry out non-interactive tasks (e.g., deploying code, patching images, rotating 
hosts, refreshing tokens, backing up data)? 
● Identifying images that are ready for production versus those that are not. 
● The configuration of IT automation tools (Ansible, chef, puppet, terraform, etc) for the 
cloud service’s specific environment. 
● What minimal custom configuration of images (e.g., security groups, password setting, 
key generation, etc.) is needed to make them secure? 
● How should development environments securely interact with the cloud service to 
deploy, debug, and manage service? 
Security Concern:  ​Unless users are aware of the specifics of the service providers 
implementation and given clear guidance in utilizing resources the service provider has made 
available for them, users are more likely to make mistakes in their tasks. 
Example mistakes include: 
● exposing credentials by hard coding secrets in code or configurations 
● leaving running image unpatched 
● failing to notice anomalous behavior of their applications in a timely manner by not 
utilizing appropriate monitoring and logging functions 
Recommended Security Best Practices 
● Provide best practice documents and support services regarding the issues 
identified in this use case:​  Service providers should provide users with documentation 
that specifies the provider’s implementation and key services that are available for the 
user to leverage.  This document should be made apparent to the user when they are 
granted access, as well at key times during configuration when it is relevant. 
● Detect common patterns of misbehavior so that users can be alerted and 
educated​:  Service providers not only need to detect misbehavior, but they should 
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attempt to educate the user through documentation as well.  Ideally, this process should 
be automated. 
2. Ensure Image Trustworthiness 
Use Case:​ In the process of their research, users may execute images of unknown provenance 
on a cloud resource.  
Security concerns:​ Executing images of unknown provenance presents several problems, 
including: how an operator establishes a curated image with a acceptable degree of trust, how 
an operator manages security updates for the operating systems and applications contained 
within images, and how operators manage the security updates of software which may be 
installed post-boot of an image (e.g. cloud-init or through user-defined metadata)? 
Recommended Security Best Practice 
Image registries​: Image registries offer an acceptable mechanism to address the 
security concerns listed above.  The minimum capabilities a third-party or home-grown 
registry solution should include, consist of (i) the ability to generate digital signatures 
over each image, (ii) the ability to scan for both vulnerabilities and stored sensitive 
information within images (detection should automatically invalidate images and alert 
users/admins), and (iii) robust (i.e., fine grained user and group) access control 
measures for managing images.  Additional, desirable features include, (iv) Single 
Sign-on (SSO) authentication, (v) an API for automation, (vi) an interactive web 
application for management, including: diffs and history of image (e.g., build process, 
configurations, subscriptions, updates), and (vii) the ability to tag images based on 
provenance (e.g., system provided, user provided) or flagged as problematic (e.g., 
malicious) [1][2][3][5][6][7][8][9]. 
Example Virtual Machines​: 
● OpenStack’s Image Service 
(​https://docs.openstack.org/ocata/config-reference/image.html​) 
● VMware vCenter Server (​https://www.vmware.com/products/vcenter-server.html​) 
Example Container Registries​: 
● Docker Trusted Registry (​https://docs.docker.com/datacenter/dtr/2.4/guides/​) - 
suitable for both Docker & Singularity 
● Twistlock (​https://www.twistlock.com/​) 
● RedHat/CoreOS (​https://coreos.com/products/container-linux-subscription/​) 
● Black Duck OpsSight (​https://www.blackducksoftware.com/products/opssight​) 
● Amazon Elastic Container Service (​https://aws.amazon.com/ecs/​) - suitable for 
Docker 
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Open Challenges 
● Managed registries do not ensure images will always be safe, it only accredits, 
depending on the features of the registry, particular aspects regarding the registered 
images, e.g., absence of known vulnerabilities, provence, or integrity. 
3. Provide Method to Manage User Secrets 
Use Case: ​Users need a reliable solution for managing (i.e., management, provisioning, 
storage, and retrieval of) secrets such as API keys, signing certificates, passphrases, and other 
sensitive information used to manage their environment. 
Security concerns: ​Cloud environments provide the ability to quickly and easily scale services, 
often in an automated fashion. Users of the environment will frequently need to store secrets 
such as API keys or passphrases for later use. If no method of managing secrets is provided by 
the service provider, the user is forced to resort to implementing their own, or worse, using none 
at all. Thus, basic security threats involving poor management of passphrases, keys, or other 
secrets could be avoided if the provider included strong and tractable secret management within 
their infrastructure. 
Recommended Security Best Practice 
Secret managers​: Service providers should offer secret managers.  Desirable features 
of a secret manager, include: API driven, mountable to the file system, support 
webhooks and event notifications, and make an access history available to query per 
stored secret.  Additionally, contents should be bidirectionally encrypted with the option 
to store a hash and provide a challenge interface for simple authentication checks rather 
than retrieval of secrets [1][5][9][10]. 
Example Secret Managers​: 
● Hashicorp Vault (​https://www.hashicorp.com/products/vault​) 
● Keywhiz (​https://square.github.io/keywhiz/)  
● Barbican (​https://github.com/openstack/barbican​) 
● AWS key management service (​https://aws.amazon.com/kms/​) 
● AWS Secrets Manager (​https://aws.amazon.com/secrets-manager/​) 
● Stache (​https://stache.utexas.edu/​) 
Other Solutions / Anti-patterns 
● There are a variety of user-focused secret management solutions which work well, but 
there are barriers to using them effectively to solve the problem for cloud providers. 
These barriers may include issues such as lack of integration, cost, and/or missing 
functionality. 
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Example Alternate Solutions​: 
● Lastpass (​https://www.lastpass.com/​) 
● Keybase (​https://keybase.io/​) 
Open Challenges 
● There is currently no consistency between service providers in what they supply, making 
each experience different for the user. 
4. Support Privileged Access within Images  
Use Case:​ Users of cloud services need privileged access within their running image to perform 
their desired tasks, e.g., running services that require registered network ports. 
Security concern(s):​ Privileged access for a user means there is no mechanism within that 
virtualized environment for an operator to constrain the user. Any processes put into place by 
the operator can be circumvented or disabled by a privileged user. Hence, a privileged user 
increases risk to the service operator, other users and third parties on the Internet. 
Recommended Security Best Practices 
● Limit image functionality via the network​: Firewalls or equivalent network 
configuration (e.g. access control lists in a router), can be used to limit the IP address 
ranges a running image can communicate with and the port range they can use 
[2][5][8][9]. 
● Network monitoring, passive or active​: Network monitoring systems,  e.g. Bro, 
Suricata, can be used to monitor what a virtual image doing via its network traffic. If 
unusual or bad activity is detected, they can be configured to alert a service provider, 
suspend a running image, or reconfigure the network to block the activity [2][5][8][9].  
Other Solutions / Anti-patterns 
● Encourage users to run security-enhanced O/S​: If a user’s image was implemented 
with, e.g., SELinux, the risk incurred by a privileged user could be mitigated.  However, 
few users have the expertise to configure and run an enhanced O/S. 
● Disallow the granting of privileged access​: This is certainly possible, but limits the 
utility of the cloud service. 
● Allow privileged access and accept risk​: This is not advised since a running image is 
on the service provider’s network address space and any consequences from 
misbehavior of the image are likely to be felt by the service provider. 
Open Challenges 
● Limiting or detecting activity that requires no network traffic within a running image with a 
privileged user is a challenge. 
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● Network traffic from a running image can use encryption or other means of obfuscation 
to circumvent network detection. 
5. Empower Users with Self-service DNS Management 
Use Case​: Users need the ability to enable secure communications across their applications, 
infrastructure, and third-party services.  
Security concerns​: The canonical method for enabling secure communication is through 
SSL/TLS, which requires possession of a certificate for the host or service.  If the process of 
obtaining a certificate is thorny, users may resort to less secure methods of communication. 
Additionally, a common variant of the canonical method has the service provider acting as a 
Certificate Authority (CA).  However, the burden imposed in operating a CA with an acceptable 
level of trust is significant, especially considering that entities already exist whose primary 
function is just that, e.g., Comodo (​https://www.comodo.com/​), and Let’s Encrypt 
(​https://letsencrypt.org/​). 
Recommended Security Best Practice 
Automatic DNS record generation & DNSaaS​: To make the process in obtaining a 
certificate seamless for the users as well as the provider, the service provider should (i) 
automatically generate DNS resource records for users categorized over several fields 
(e.g., project, account, resource), and (ii) provide a programmable, API-driven, 
self-service DNS management or DNS-as-a-Service (DNSaaS) which allows users to 
build upon the resource records they received in (i) in order to generate new resource 
records describing their services.  Using these latter resource records, users can then 
request certificates through, e.g., Let’s Encrypt . 2
Example DNS Management Components​: 
● AtomiaDNS (​http://atomiadns.com/​) 
● PowerDNS (​https://www.powerdns.com/​) 
Example DNSaaService Components​: 
● OpenStack’s Designate (​https://docs.openstack.org/designate/latest/​) 
Other Solutions / Anti-patterns 
● User-centric process​: The canonical process for users to obtain a certificate is as 
follows: (i) users obtains a domain or subdomain name, after spinning up a VM and 
getting its hostname (ii) users publish PTR records mapping their domain to A records, 
(iii) request a certificate for their host or service from a Certificate Authority (CA), and (iv) 
possibly prove that they actually own the host and ip.  However, this human-in-the-loop 
2 ​https://github.com/deardooley/dns-as-a-service-recommendations 
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process is cumbersome due to time, effort and resources lost in waiting on humans to 
request/issue certs, installing, monitoring, renewing, and rotating certificates every 1-2 
years, and leasing a domain name and possibly purchasing a certificate authorities 
services. 
6. Provide Method to Manage User Configurations 
Use case: ​Users with more than one similar application to manage across images may lack 
consistency in the implementation of security controls and state between applications. 
Security concern​: As a user needs to manage more applications, the difficulty of managing the 
security controls can lead to security controls being incorrectly configured or unimplemented. 
This leaves systems open to a wider range of attacks and increases the security risk of the 
overall environment.  Additionally, if a host’s configuration is corrupted (e.g., through 
compromise), the user may not know how to restore that host's configuration to a known good 
configuration quickly and thus may avoid properly re-implementing security controls. 
Recommended Security Best Practice 
Provide configuration managers​: Providers should offer solutions that provide some 
level of management over the applications they run within their images.  This can be 
passed to the image on startup, e.g., atmosphere, or pulled in from the application or 
other system software running within the image [1]. 
Example Configuration Managers: 
● Ansible (​https://www.ansible.com/​) 
● Puppet (​https://puppet.com/​) 
● Chef (​https://www.chef.io/chef/​) 
● Salt Stack (​https://saltstack.com/​) 
● Atmosphere's Ansible Instance Deployment Setup   3
● AWS Config (​https://aws.amazon.com/conf​ig/​) 
Open Challenges 
● Securing access and storage of configuration 
7. Provide Service Accounts 
Use Case:​ Users should be able to carry out non-interactive tasks, e.g., deploying code, 
patching images, rotating hosts, refreshing tokens, and backing up data without losing full 
account access if the service providers identifies an issue during those task and thus needs to 
3 ​https://github.com/cyverse/atmosphere-ansible 
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shutdown the account in response to a potential security event. 
Security concern:​ Users with a single account for managing all aspects of their cloud utilization 
increase their risk when any aspect of their account is compromised requiring the service 
provider is to disable all access to the user. Thus the user faces significant risk in adopting a 
single cloud provider for multiple projects and/or use cases as a compromise in one context will 
result in suspension in all contexts. 
Recommended Security Best Practice 
Service accounts​: Users should carrying out non-interactive tasks, e.g., deploying 
code, patching images, rotating hosts, refreshing tokens, backing up data, etc., through 
unique service accounts -- a user account that is created with the sole purpose of 
providing a specific security context to a service when the service is running. 
Compartmentalizing a user’s account to an authorized scope mitigates the issue of a 
user being completely locked-down during a security incident.  That is, the authorized 
scope, or service account, can instantly be invalidated instead, without requiring the 
need to take the entire user account offline.  Moreover, by managing service accounts at 
the provider level, the provider can offer secure management of the service account 
credentials, thus enabling automated key rotation on images, repositories, etc. 
The ability to create and associate accounts is found in almost all IAM solutions in use 
today.  For example, WSO2’s Identity Server (​https://docs.wso2.com/display/IS550​) has 
a feature called Federated Authentication that fulfills this utility.  Distinguished Names 
(DN) with attribute assignment in LDAP (​https://ldap.com/ldap-dns-and-rdns/​) also 
provides methods to create service accounts. 
Other Solutions / Anti-patterns 
● XSEDE community accounts – multiple, related users run jobs under one account 
(warehouse approach) 
● Unix service accounts (insufficient scope) 
● OAuth2 scopes (insufficient accessibility and customization) 
8. Offer Monitoring Services 
Use Case:​ Users need to be aware of the current state of their systems including hosts, 
firewalls, networks, storage services, and infrastructure. 
Security concerns: ​Comprehensivity is a core principle of good security . Users who are not 4
aware of the current state of system operations, dependent systems, vulnerable systems and 
4 https://cacr.iu.edu/principles/ 
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software, available resources, and activity in their environment are at at increased risk. They 
may also be less aware of a compromise when it occurs. 
Recommended Security Best Practices 
● Provide an interface to existing monitoring solutions for users to access​: The 
service provider should leverage existing monitoring solutions in place by enabling users 
to automatically retrieve pertinent events regarding the users’ account, image, 
applications, etc. 
● Provide notification of infrastructure service outages:​ The service provider should 
provide a user accessible page providing infrastructure monitoring information to alert 
users when a planned or unplanned outage is occurring that potentially affects their 
services. 
Example Monitoring Interface Solutions​: 
● Nagios (​https://www.nagios.com/​) 
● Icinga (​https://www.icinga.com/products/icinga-2/​) 
● AWS CloudWatch (​https://aws.amazon.com/cloudwatch​) 
● Vulnerability scanners such as OpenVAS (​http://www.openvas.org/​) 
● Cachet (​https://github.com/CachetHQ/Cachet​) 
● Public facing service status pages 
● Provide user API to check status of operational attributes. 
● Rackspace Monitoring as a Service for OpenStack 
● Notifying affected users/stakeholders of service outages 
Open Challenges 
● Providing status information to users in secure manner. 
● Not all providers offer access to system status information via an API 
9. Offer IAM-aware CI/CD Services 
Use Case​: Users will utilize CI/CD (Continuous Integration / Continuous Delivery) services, e.g., 
Ansible , GitLab Continuous Integration & Deployment , Drone , and Jenkins  in order to ease 5 6 7 8
Development and Operations (DevOps) of their applications. 
Security concern​: Although users can easily setup-up CI/CD solutions, it is extremely easy to 
leave sensitive information exposed, thereby exposing the infrastructure on which it is running 
as well as the infrastructure with which the CI/CD service interacts with. 
5 ​https://www.ansible.com/overview/it-automation 
6 ​https://about.gitlab.com/features/gitlab-ci-cd/ 
7 ​https://drone.io/ 
8 ​https://jenkins.io/ 
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Recommended Security Best Practice 
Offer hosted, multi-tenant CI/CD services​: Providers should offer hosted, multi-tenant 
CI/CD services that can integrate with the providers’ existing AAA and monitoring 
solutions (see ​3. Provide Methods to Manage User Secrets​, and ​8. Offer Monitor 
Services​).  This will reduce the accessibility of a user’s sensitive information, while 
adding value to their clouds and increasing their accessibility. 
Example CI/CD Services (w/Integrating IAM) Solutions​: 
● Jenkins (​https://jenkins.io/​) 
● Tower (​https://github.com/ansible/awx​) 
● TravisCI (​https://travis-ci.org/​) 
● Rundeck (​https://www.rundeck.com/open-source​) 
● CircleCI (​https://circleci.com/​) 
● AWS Code Deploy (​https://aws.amazon.com/codedeploy/​) 
● CodeShip (​https://codeship.com/​) 
● TeamCity (​https://www.jetbrains.com/teamcity/​) 
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Appendix A: General Security Concerns For 
Providers 
Below are a list of security concerns that could affect cloud resource and service providers 
when exposed to the use-cases above without implementing the best practices for mitigating the 
risk the use-cases introduce.  It is not meant to be an all inclusive list, but merely a highlight of 
some of the common and impactful security concerns.  
1. Loss/failure of operational dependencies 
This is a high-level concern facing resource and service providers.  It encompasses the loss or 
failure of hardware, software (e.g., hypervisor and images) or data (e.g., configuration, 
accounting, policies, and user filestores) that the provider’s service is dependent on.  The loss 
can be resultant from human error (e.g., mis-configuration), malicious actors (e.g, compromise), 
or natural phenomenon.  Specific instances of the general follow: 
1.1 Denial of Service (DoS, DDoS) 
A malicious actor may subvert the network, or in some cases host applications, in order to inhibit 
access to, or operation of, provider services. Similarly, a user due to either an 
ambitious/overzealous workload or misconfiguration could consume more than their fair share of 
resources. 
Mitigating​ ​Use-cases​: ​Disseminate Localized Best Practices​, ​Ensure Image 
Trustworthiness​, ​Offer Monitor Services​, ​Provide Method to Manage User Secrets​, 
Provide Method to Manage User Configurations​, ​Provide IAM-aware CI/CD Services​, 
Support Privileged Access within Images​,  
1.2 Execution of malicious applications within images 
A malicious actor may gain control of an user application within an image, and although the 
actor may not be able to compromise hypervisor/management tools, they could initiate DoS 
attacks against the provider’s CI, as well as attempt to attack other user applications. 
Mitigating​ ​Use-cases​: ​Disseminate Localized Best Practices​, ​Ensure Image 
Trustworthiness​, ​Offer Monitor Services​, ​Provide Method to Manage User Secrets​, 
Provide Method to Manage User Configurations​, ​Provide IAM-aware CI/CD Services​, 
Support Privileged Access within Images​,  
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2. Increased exposure to vulnerabilities 
Users applications, whether natively insecure or unpatched, can increase the attack surface of 
an image, raising the risk of lost science to the users within the image, and potentially 
loss/failure of operational dependencies for the provider. 
Mitigating​ ​Use-cases​: ​Disseminate Localized Best Practices​, ​Ensure Image 
Trustworthiness​, ​Offer Monitor Services​, ​Provide Method to Manage User Secrets​, 
Provide Method to Manage User Configurations​, ​Provide IAM-aware CI/CD Services​, 
Support Privileged Access within Images​,  
3. Ineffective or untimely incident response/analysis 
Incident response and analysis are essential components within a provider’s security program. 
However, implementing and ensuring the efficacy of response procedures is challenging, for it is 
difficult to measure their performance outside of a security event. 
Mitigating​ ​Use-cases​: ​Ensure Image Trustworthiness​, ​Offer Monitor Services 
4. Loss/exposure of user data within images due to factors within 
provider’s purview 
Images, either through faulty software/hardware, misconfiguration, or a malicious actor (e.g., a 
side-channel attack) could manipulate the data within another image. 
Mitigating​ ​Use-cases​: ​Ensure Image Trustworthiness​, ​Provide Method to Manage User 
Secrets​, ​Provide Method to Manage User Configurations​, ​Support Privileged Access 
within Images​,  
5. Loss of reputation 
Loss of reputation is, usually, a side-effect inherited by a tangible security concern.  Note, the 
service provider could suffer reputation not only from an incident within their system, but an 
incident that affects users’ images. 
Mitigating​ ​Use-cases​: ​Disseminate Localized Best Practices​, ​Ensure Image 
Trustworthiness​, ​Offer Monitor Services​, ​Provide Method to Manage User Secrets​, 
Provide Method to Manage User Configurations​, ​Provide IAM-aware CI/CD Services​, 
Support Privileged Access within Images​,  
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Appendix B: General Security Concerns For Users 
Below are a list of security concerns that could affect users of cloud service providers when 
exposed to the use-cases above without implementing the best practices for mitigating the risk 
the use-cases introduce.  It is not meant to be an all inclusive list, but merely a highlight of some 
of the common and impactful security concerns users may experience. 
1. Loss or unpredictability of services/performance 
Users expect resources to be available and operate at a certain level of performance, either 
through contract or simple familiarity.  Deviations from those expectations become major 
impediments to users. 
Mitigating​ ​Use-case​: ​Disseminate Localized Best Practices​, ​Ensure Image 
Trustworthiness​, ​Offer Monitor Services​, ​Provide Method to Manage User Secrets​, 
Provide Method to Manage User Configurations​, ​Provide IAM-aware CI/CD Services​, 
Provide Service Accounts​, ​Support Privileged Access within Images​,  
2. Loss/exposure of secrets & sensitive/embargoed data 
Through the use of faulty applications (i.e., unpatched, misconfigured, unencrypted) within their 
images, users may expose secrets and/or data that was not public. 
Mitigating​ ​Use-case: ​Disseminate Localized Best Practices​, ​Ensure Image 
Trustworthiness​, ​Offer Monitor Services​, ​Provide Method to Manage User Secrets​, 
Provide Method to Manage User Configurations​, ​Provide IAM-aware CI/CD Services​, 
Support Privileged Access within Images​,  
3. Loss of reputation 
Loss of reputation is, usually, a side-effect inherited by a tangible security concern. 
Mitigating​ ​Use-cases​: ​Disseminate Localized Best Practices​, ​Empower Users with 
Self-service DNS Management​, ​Ensure Image Trustworthiness​, ​Offer Monitor Services​, 
Provide Method to Manage User Secrets​, ​Provide Method to Manage User 
Configurations​, ​Provide IAM-aware CI/CD Services​, ​Support Privileged Access within 
Images​,  
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Appendix C: Artifacts Inventory 
The following table lists documents considered by the working group in their discussions. 
Name URL 
Application Container Security Guide - Draft NIST SP 
800-190 
https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/
sp/800-190/draft/documents/sp800-190-draft.p
df 
10 Layers of Container Security 
https://www.redhat.com/cms/managed-files/cl-c
ontainer-security-openshift-cloud-devops-tech-
detail-f7530kc-201705-en.pdf 
Introduction to Container Security 
https://www.docker.com/sites/default/files/WP_I
ntrotoContainerSecurity_08.19.2016.pdf 
Docker Security 
https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/securit
y/ 
Best practices for Azure VM security 
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security
/azure-security-best-practices-vms 
Best Practices for Mitigating Risks in Virtualized 
Environments 
https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/whit
epapers/Best_Practices_for%20_Mitigating_Ri
sks_Virtual_Environments_April2015_4-1-15_
GLM5.pdf 
The Ultimate Guide to Container Security 
https://www.twistlock.com/2017/07/06/ultimate-
guide-container-security/?ads_cmpid=7519103
45&ads_adid=55078119828&ads_matchtype=
b&ads_network=g&ads_creative=23616646602
1&utm_term=docker%20container%20security
%20best%20practices&ads_targetid=kwd-3604
39846536&utm_campaign=&utm_source=adw
ords&utm_medium=ppc&ttv=2&gclid=EAIaIQo
bChMIvYS4zILs2AIVWlcNCh3KmwQJEAAYAS
ABEgKPwPD_BwE 
Security Recommendations for Hypervisor 
Deployment on Servers - NIST SP 800-125A 
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublicati
ons/NIST.SP.800-125A.pdf 
AppArmor https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AppArmor 
SELinux 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced
_Linux 
Virtualization Security Checklist 
http://m.isaca.org/Knowledge-Center/Research/
Documents/Virtualization-Security-Checklist_re
s_Eng_1010.pdf 
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Security of the VMware vSphere Hypervisor 
https://www.vmware.com/content/dam/digitalm
arketing/vmware/en/pdf/whitepaper/techpaper/v
mw-white-paper-secrty-vsphr-hyprvsr-uslet-101
.pdf 
Security Recommendations When Deploying Citrix 
XenServer 
https://www.citrix.com/content/dam/citrix/en_us/
documents/white-paper/security-recommendati
ons-when-deploying-citrix-xenserver.pdf 
Amazon Web Services: Overview of Security 
Processes 
https://d1.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/Security/
AWS_Security_Whitepaper.pdf 
Security At Linode https://www.linode.com/security 
Rackspace System Status 
https://rackspace.service-now.com/system_stat
us/ 
Openstack Security Guide https://docs.openstack.org/security-guide/ 
Amazon AWS Secrets Manager https://aws.amazon.com/secrets-manager/ 
SEI Best Practices for Cloud Security 
https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/sei_blog/2018/03/b
est-practices-for-cloud-security.html 
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Appendix D: Working Group and Process 
This document is a product of the working group consisting of: 
● Agave Platform:  
○ Rion Dooley, Principal Investigator / Lead Developer  
● Cornell University Center for Advanced Computing:  
○ Richard Knepper, Deputy Director, CAC   
○ Resa Reynolds, Assistant Director, Systems NSF Aristotle Cloud Federation 
Infrastructure Lead   
● CyVerse:   
○ Edwin Skidmore, Director of Infrastructure  
○ Andy Edmonds, Senior Systems Administrator   
● Jetstream:   
○ David Hancock, Principal Investigator, Program Director for Advanced 
Cyberinfrastructure  
○ Mike Lowe, Senior Cloud Engineer  
○ IU University Information Security Office. The IU UISO has agreed to review the 
final report if desired. Depending on the size and scope may also be willing to 
participate in the security review process as well.   
● Trusted CI: 
○ Andrew Adams, PSC 
○ Ryan Kiser, IU/CACR 
○ Mark Krenz, IU/CACR 
○ Von Welch, IU/CACR 
This working group was formed as a result of an Engagement Application request to Trusted CI9
. The group met over a period of six months from January, 2018 through June, 2018. It used the 
following process for authoring this document: 
1. Determining and documenting the relevant cloud use cases.  
a. Use cases identified by the participants in their applications (e.g. Jetstream’s 
secure enclave for untrusted VM images) would be incorporated at this stage.  
2. Determining the relevant stakeholders from the use cases and their security concerns.  
3. Surveying existing Best Practices documents that cover container and VM security.  
4. Identify those solutions that address any of our concerns.  
5. Weighting the security concerns and determining and documenting reasonable 
mitigations for each.  
a. Those identified in other Best Practices may just need to be weighted.  
6. Selecting a reasonable subset of the mitigations and using them as the basis for the 
Best Practices.  
9 https://trustedci.org/application 
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7. Determining and documenting a set of principles for secure operation of a cloud 
computing resource.  
8. Documenting relevant resources for implementing the Best Practices. 
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